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CIVIL DISSENT BY OBEDIENCE AND 
DISOBEDIENCE: EXPLOITING THE GAP 
BETWEEN OFFICIAL RULES AND SOCIETAL 
NORMS AND EXPECTATIONS 
DANIEL R. CORREA

 
ABSTRACT 
Civil dissent comes in many forms, from peaceful protest to open 
violation of official rules. But strict obedience to official rules may also 
serve as a dissenting act. Professors Jessica Bulman-Pozen and David E. 
Pozen examine obedience as dissent in their article, Uncivil Obedience. 
The term “uncivil obedience” is meant to capture what Bulman-Pozen and 
Pozen consider the paradox expressed by “insolence toward law” through 
conformity to law. This inversely mirrors the paradox expressed by a civil 
disobedient’s fidelity to law through violation of law.  
Conceptually, ‘uncivil obedience’ is best understood as a form of civil 
disobedience. An uncivil obedient’s departure from societal expectations 
or norms serves the same purpose as a civil disobedient’s departure from 
an official rule: both expose the gap between law and societal 
expectations or norms and draw attention to what is just, right, or good to 
close the gap. Analyzing what Bulman-Pozen and Pozen term “uncivil 
obedience” as an act of civil disobedience also avoids theoretical 
problems when confronted with general jurisprudence questions 
pertaining to the concept of law, and avoids practical problems, namely, 
sleight-of-hand political maneuvering. 
INTRODUCTION  
“Injustice anywhere is a threat to justice everywhere,” wrote Martin 
Luther King, Jr. in his “Letter from Birmingham Jail.”1 A just law for 
King, as well as in the tradition of Saint Thomas Aquinas, is one that 
 
 
  Daniel is an associate attorney at Cowles & Thompson, P.C. in Dallas, Texas. The following 
people made this article possible and complete: Callie Brewer, Bryan S. Ryan, Ethan Brandt, Alyssa 
Kutner, and the Washington University Jurisprudence Review editors.  
 1. Martin Luther King, Jr., Letter from Birmingham Jail, in JURISPRUDENCE CLASSICAL AND 
CONTEMPORARY: FROM NATURAL LAW TO POSTMODERNISM 46 (Robert L. Hayman Jr. et al. eds., 2d 
ed. 2002).  
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“squares with the moral law or the law of God.”2 King considered laws 
that uplift human personality just and laws that degrade human personality 
unjust.
3
 He openly disobeyed segregation ordinances to protest what he 
considered unjust laws, as he felt that “[a]ll segregation statutes are unjust 
because segregation distorts the soul and damages the personality.”4  
King’s “Letter from Birmingham Jail” is celebrated as a justification 
for both civil disobedience and a duty to obey law. King writes within the 
natural law tradition. The natural law tradition views laws as hierarchically 
ordered, with human-made law (positive law) at the bottom and moral law 
or God’s law (natural law) at the top. This tradition confronts the 
following question: what is one to do when positive law directly 
contradicts natural law? For King the answer is to obey natural law or 
right reason, which often equates to “obey your conscience.” 
In “Uncivil Obedience,”5 Jessica Bulman-Pozen and David E. Pozen 
reexamine the tension that can arise between positive law and natural law 
that King and others sought to reconcile. The term “uncivil obedience” is 
meant to capture what Bulman-Pozen and Pozen consider the paradox 
expressed by “insolence toward law” through conformity to law. This 
inversely mirrors the paradox expressed by a civil disobedient’s fidelity to 
law through the violation of law.  
Though Bulman-Pozen and Pozen claim that the ‘uncivil obedience’ 
label is not intended to “do any critical work,”6 one cannot disassociate the 
label from a key characteristic attributed to uncivil obedience: legal 
provocation. To qualify as uncivil obedience, an act must “call[] attention 
to its own formal legality, while departing from prevailing customs or 
expectations as to how the law will be followed or applied.”7 For Bulman-
Pozen and Pozen, this aspect of provocation “underwrites its ‘incivility.’”8 
By its own terms, then, obedience does little work. Disobedience drives 
the entire dissenting act. Conceptually, ‘uncivil obedience’ is best 
understood as a form of civil disobedience.  
This Article proceeds in three parts. The first lays out Bulman-Pozen 
and Pozen’s argument regarding ‘uncivil obedience’ as a social 
 
 
 2. Id. at 49; ST. THOMAS AQUINAS, SUMMA THEOLOGICA, pt. I-II, question 96, art. 4 (R. J. 
Henle ed., 1993).  
 3. King, supra note 1, at 49. 
 4. Id. 
 5. Jessica Bulman-Pozen & David E. Pozen, Uncivil Obedience, 115 COLUM. L. REV. 809 
(2015). 
 6. Id. at 826 n.60.  
 7. Id. at 820.  
 8. Id. at 826. 
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phenomenon. The second argues that disobedience drives the entire 
analysis and, consequently, that uncivil obedience is best understood as a 
form of civil disobedience. The third briefly addresses problems with both 
the definition and scope of uncivil obedience. Specifically, the term 
‘uncivil obedience’ unravels when plugged into positivist and non-
positivist philosophical frameworks. Further, the term creates a real risk of 
sleight-of-hand political maneuvering. 
I. UNCIVIL OBEDIENCE 
Bulman-Pozen and Pozen identify uncivil obedience as an often 
overlooked, under-the-radar form of civil dissent.
9
 Whereas a civil 
disobedient openly defies a law to highlight the illegitimacy of the very 
law disobeyed or to highlight another law or laws’ illegitimacy, the uncivil 
obedient “seek[s] to disrupt an existing legal regime by adhering—in a 
hyperbolic, literalistic, or otherwise unanticipated manner—to its formal 
rules.”10 By its open defiance, civil disobedience is more transparent than 
uncivil obedience.
11
 
In an effort to lend transparency to dissent by obedience to law, 
Bulman-Pozen and Pozen define uncivil obedience as a deliberate act that 
conveys criticism of a law through obedience to all applicable positive 
law, intending to change or disrupt that law or policy by calling attention 
to the act’s formal adherence to law while departing from the manner in 
which society customarily follows the law or expects the law to be applied 
(such as by departing from the purposes that underlie the target law).
12
 
This definition mirrors necessary and sufficient conditions for an act to 
qualify as civil disobedience, but inverts the manner of dissent (conformity 
to law rather than deviation from it) and what makes the act provocative 
(strict adherence to law rather than disregard of it).
13
  
 
 
 9. Id. at 810–11.  
 10. Id. at 810. The quoted statement is too broad. Obedience to law as a form of dissent works 
primarily, even in the examples provided by Bulman-Pozen and Pozen, to undo a particular law, that 
is, to highlight the illegitimacy of a particular law. The National Motorist Association deployed its 
members to strictly adhere to the fifty-five mile-per-hour speed limit to challenge the law by showing 
it did not conform to society’s driving practices. See id. No legal regime was disrupted any more than 
a legal regime would be disrupted by mass disobedience, such as a majority of people not adhering to 
posted speed limits. The National Motorists Association did not employ this strategy in an effort to 
disrupt any legal regime; obedience to law would provide a poor route to this end.  
 11. Id. at 862–63.  
 12. Id. at 820. 
 13. Id. at 820–21. 
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According to their definition, uncivil obedience spans dissent by 
private individuals, private and public organizations, government officials, 
and branches of government other than the judiciary.
14
 Private individuals 
might organize a protest in an effort to increase the speed limit from fifty-
five miles-per-hour to sixty-five miles-per-hour by using the law against 
itself as their means of protest. The individuals would protest by strictly 
driving the speed limit, which goes against “common practice and widely 
shared sense of desirable practice”—i.e. driving above the speed limit.15 In 
another example, to reform the criminal justice system people might 
organize to leverage their right to a trial by jury through strictly rejecting 
any plea offers, thereby overwhelming the legal system.
16
 Additionally, 
state lawmakers might strictly adhere to federal health and safety standards 
as a means to challenge abortion rights, for example, by requiring “all 
medication-induced abortions adhere strictly to a regimen approved (but 
not required) by the Food and Drug Administration.”17 Also, federal 
lawmakers might employ the filibuster procedure on a routine basis, rather 
than in its traditional use as “‘the tool of last resort,’” as a means to thwart 
legislation.
18
 The executive branch also may participate in acts of uncivil 
obedience. The President, for example, might strictly enforce a law in an 
effort to generate a repeal process.
19
  
Bulman-Pozen and Pozen offer their definition of uncivil obedience in 
an effort to generate theoretical and empirical research on the matter. 
Uncivil obedience, they claim, should be subject to the same normative 
assessment as civil disobedience.
20
 By investigating subversive obedience 
to law, social scientists and legal philosophers might delineate when such 
action promotes public values, how marginalized and powerful groups 
leverage law to their benefit, and reveal that protest and dissent span the 
political left and right.
21
   
 
 
 14. Id. at 833–34.  
 15. Id. at 818. 
 16. Id. at 830. 
 17. Id. at 819–20.  
 18. Id. at 834 (quoting Walter J. Oleszek, Congressional Procedure and the Police Process 304 
(9th ed. 2014)). 
 19. Id. at 831–32. 
 20. Id. at 860. 
 21. Id. at 860–71. 
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II. CIVIL DISSENT BY OBEDIENCE AND DISOBEDIENCE: WHERE DOES THE 
PROVOCATION LIE? 
Provocation drives both uncivil obedience and civil disobedience. An 
uncivil obedient’s attentiveness to law “strike[s] others as jarring or 
subversive” when it runs against prevailing customs, according to 
Bulman-Pozen and Pozen.
22
 Likewise, a civil disobedient’s open violation 
of law is provocative on its face, because most people expect general 
obedience to law.
23
 A closer look reveals that obedience to law does little 
to no work in the provocation analysis. Like civil disobedience, what 
makes an uncivil obedient’s attentiveness to law provocative is his or her 
disobedience to prevailing customs, social expectations, or the purposes 
that underlie the subject law or official rule.  
This part demonstrates that disobedience drives uncivil obedience by 
looking at Socrates’ defiant stance against the prevailing custom in Athens 
of fleeing a death sentence and by looking at how obedience and 
disobedience work when official rules align and when they do not align 
with prevailing custom or practice. Revealing the dissenting nature of 
obedience under these conditions helps rid clutter from our conceptual 
space. What Bulman-Pozen and Pozen wish to call ‘uncivil obedience’ is 
better understood and examined as civil dissent on par with, and possibly 
only with, civil disobedience.  
A. Socrates and the Hemlock: Civil Dissent Through Obedience to Law by 
Disobedience to Prevailing Customs 
Plato’s Crito offers a compelling philosophical defense for an 
unequivocal duty to obey the law. In the Crito, Socrates appears to defend 
obedience to law—even to what one may consider an unjust law—as he 
stoically accepts his death sentence. Frances Olsen suggests, however, that 
if one were to look to Athenian social practices at the time, Socrates’s 
obedience to law may have been considered a defiant act, an act Olsen 
describes as civil disobedience.
24
  
Socrates in the Apology adamantly defends obedience to his own 
conscience over unjust laws.
25
 After he is convicted and sentenced to death 
 
 
 22. Id. at 825.  
 23. Id. at 827, 827 n.61.  
 24. Frances Olsen, Socrates on Legal Obligation: Legitimation Theory and Civil Disobedience, 
18 GA. L. REV. 929 (1984).  
 25. Id. at 933–38. 
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for violating those same laws, a wealthy friend pays Socrates a visit and 
offers Socrates an opportunity to escape jail.
26
 Socrates lays out an 
argument as to why he has a duty to follow through with his sentence and 
drink the hemlock, notwithstanding the extent to which the laws under 
which he was convicted were unjust.
27
 He then declines his friend’s offer. 
However, Olsen questions whether one should read the Crito so 
superficially. Among Crito’s arguments to Socrates as to why he should 
flee is that “if he refused to escape, the people of Athens would blame 
Socrates’s friends for having failed him.”28 Among Greek popular values, 
“successful and admirable men (agathos) were those able to protect and 
benefit their friends, and by the generally accepted scale of values it was 
agathos to thwart the laws to benefit one’s family or friends.”29 Taking 
Crito’s concern seriously, Olsen posits that a custom of securing a friend’s 
freedom may have existed at this pivotal moment in Socrates’s life.30 
Knowing this scale of values, and having exhausted his remedies in the 
legal system, Socrates’s refusal to escape may be read not as obedience to 
law, but as his final act of defiance.
31
 
By accepting his death, Socrates would have the Athenian people 
accept the full breadth of the laws that purported to govern them. 
Condemning one to death would arguably weigh less on one’s conscience 
when a background custom allows the condemned person to escape. 
Rather than let Athenians have it both ways, Socrates’s defiance to custom 
would force Athenians “to reconsider their unjust ways.”32 He drew 
attention to the conflict that existed between “what the law said and what 
the people really meant . . . [and] between the virtuous sentiments that the 
people of Athens claimed to believe and the behavior that they actually 
practiced.”33 This act of disobedience to custom is appropriately analyzed 
as an act of civil disobedience.
34
   
 
 
 26. Id. at 931. 
 27. Id. at 931–32. 
 28. Id. at 944.  
 29. Id. at 945. 
 30. Id. at 945–46. 
 31. Id. at 946. 
 32. Id.  
 33. Id. at 947. 
 34. Id. at 959–66. 
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B. Obedience and Disobedience When Law Aligns with Custom/Practice 
or the Law’s Purpose 
Provocation, according to Bulman-Pozen and Pozen, “inheres in the 
gap between the official rules and the unofficial customs that coexist in a 
given area, . . . and in the attention that is called to this gap.”35 To unpack 
this statement, consider where the provocation lies when official rules 
align with unofficial customs. But first, what content fills the gap? The 
gap contains the reformist’s values and his or her beliefs as to what is just, 
right, or good.
36
 
If the official speed limit is fifty-five miles per hour and the unofficial 
custom is to drive fifty-five miles per hour, obedience to one is obedience 
to the other, no matter one’s motive to obey the one or the other. And, if 
one wished to exploit the gap between official rule and unofficial custom 
by pointing to what is good, just, or right, at best others will view any 
reformist intent as trivial. Nothing provocative occurs.  
Conversely, disobedience to one is disobedience to both, which is 
highly provocative. The act of disobedience itself draws attention to the 
gap, to what is good, right, or just. It is safe to conclude that when the 
official rules and unofficial customs align, only disobedience is 
provocative in any interesting sense.  
C. Obedience and Disobedience When Law Does Not Align with 
Custom/Practice or the Law’s Purpose 
When official rules and unofficial customs do not align, opportunities 
to exploit the gap appear available through either obedience or 
disobedience. But upon close inspection, disobedience really drives the 
exploitation.  
If the official speed limit is fifty-five miles per hour and the unofficial 
custom is to drive sixty-five miles per hour, obedience to one is 
disobedience to the other, and vice-versa. Where does the provocation lie? 
That is, what draws attention to the gap? Bulman-Pozen and Pozen point 
to what they consider unconventional obedience to official rules—strictly 
driving the speed limit. But one can just as easily point to disobedience to 
 
 
 35. Bulman-Pozen & Pozen, supra note 5, at 827. 
 36. See Olsen, supra note 24, at 956–57 (describing Socrates’ struggle as one about human 
values); Bulman-Pozen & Pozen, supra note 5, at 814–15, 815 n.17 (explaining that an act of civil 
disobedience requires the actor to hold sincere desire to change the law as a matter of justice or 
morality).  
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unofficial custom, like the Socrates example above. In fact, executive 
officials have no reason to be provoked by obedience to law. The goal of 
any legal system is to garner perfect obedience to official rules.  
If, instead, a group of persons gets together to protest the fifty-five 
mile-per-hour speed limit by driving sixty-five miles per hour and 
plastering their vehicles with big signs that say, ‘I am driving ten miles 
over the speed limit,’ would one consider their obedience to unofficial 
custom provocative? Executive officials will consider disobedience to the 
unofficial rules provocative. But others within the purview of the 
community’s customs have little reason to be provoked by others driving 
within the unofficial customary limits. 
Undoubtedly, obedience to rules in a manner designed to showcase 
their deficiencies may prove provocative, but it would not be so if there 
were not some competing norm vying for obedience. Bulman-Pozen and 
Pozen’s article undervalues the role disobedience plays in the dissenting 
act of one they label an uncivil obedient. As Olsen points out, obedience to 
law in a quest to exploit the gap—to attain what one considers just, good, 
or right—provides another avenue for civil dissent when disobedience to 
law or official rules proves ineffective or less effective. If one cannot get 
her point across by disobedience to the formal rules, one may have more 
luck disobeying the informal rules. Informal rules, in fact, may prove more 
personal to the community at issue than formal rules. 
When official rules and unofficial custom do not align, civil dissent 
through obedience to official rules and disobedience to unofficial custom 
and through obedience to unofficial custom and disobedience to official 
rules differ only in the means employed to exploit the gap, to bring these 
two into alignment and in accord with what one considers good, just, or 
right. But both rely on disobedience to provoke others, to draw attention to 
the gap. And insofar as both aim to improve the existing legal system, both 
are civil means of protest. As a conceptual matter, to better understand 
civil dissent through obedience to official rules by disobedience to 
unofficial customs (or rules), one should explore this phenomenon as a 
form of civil disobedience.  
III. THE PROBLEMS THAT INHERE IN “UNCIVIL OBEDIENCE”: WHAT 
MAKES LAW? AND WHAT MAKES GOOD LAW-MAKING PRACTICES?  
Nothing controversial lies in the proposition that obedience to rules that 
purport to govern a group of people can serve as a subversive act. But to 
consider such an act uncivil obedience raises the philosophical question 
whether the subject rule is law. The label ‘uncivil obedience’ threatens to 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_jurisprudence/vol8/iss2/7
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clutter conceptual space with unnecessary furniture. It conceptually 
unravels when faced with the jurisprudential question, “what makes 
law?”37  
Likewise, the proposition that lawmakers might employ procedures 
available to all members to leverage concessions on a proposed law or to 
defeat a proposed law altogether raises no controversy. Nor does any 
controversy arise by the proposition that state lawmakers might create 
laws that purport to adhere to federal statutory or regulatory standards, 
although some legislators harbor ulterior motives. But to incorporate the 
lawmaking process under the label ‘uncivil obedience’ only obscures the 
real issue— the best lawmaking practices in a democratic society. To 
consider lawmaking uncivil obedience also creates opportunity for sleight 
of hand political maneuvering.  
A. What Makes Law? 
Legal philosophers have labored over determining what makes 
something law as opposed to just a rule-of-thumb or suggestion. 
Traditionally, this debate has spawned naturalism—the belief that 
anything called ‘law’ must conform to some moral code or conception of 
justice or right reason—and positivism—the position that law is a social 
fact, identifiable by objective criteria without repair to morality, the good, 
the right, or the just.
38
 When one wishes to discuss obedience to law in the 
context of civil dissent, he or she must inevitably confront the question, 
what makes law?
39
 Plugging ‘uncivil obedience’ into either a positivist or 
non-positivist
40
 framework yields little to nothing toward understanding 
the posited phenomenon itself.  
This part does not intend to, nor could it possibly, detail the vast 
literature that covers both legal positivism and non-positivism. Using 
Joseph Raz’s positivist approach to law and Ronald Dworkin’s moral 
 
 
 37. Professor Liam Murphy tackles this age-old philosophical debate in his new book whose title 
tracks the inquiry, What Makes Law? See LIAM MURPHY, WHAT MAKES LAW? AN INTRODUCTION TO 
THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW (2014).  
 38. Id. at 1–5. 
 39. Bulman-Pozen and Pozen disclaim any interest in wading into “analytic jurisprudence and 
political philosophy debates over the nature of legal obligations or the justifiability of resistance to 
authority.” Bulman-Pozen & Pozen, supra note 5, at 860. The discussion in this part of this Article 
indirectly touches on the nature of legal obligations only insofar as it looks into the nature or essence 
of law. But this part, like Bulman-Pozen and Pozen’s article, does not delve into whether a pro tanto or 
general obligation to obey law exists.  
 40. Liam Murphy coined the term “non-postivism” to bring analytical clarity to the philosophical 
debate over the nature of law. See Murphy, supra note 37, at 2. This Article will use “non-positivism” 
rather than “naturalism.”  
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reading (non-positivist) approach to law, this part demonstrates the 
conceptual instability of ‘uncivil obedience.’ 
1. Legal Positivism and Uncivil Obedience 
Joseph Raz examined the fundamental features of the thing called law 
by looking at the concept rather than the nature of law.
41
 When one looks 
to a thing’s essence or nature, there generally will be a fact of the matter 
that inevitably renders disagreement moot. Whether and to what extent 
law is one such thing might be disputed, but Raz offered to conceptually 
delineate law to rationally talk about law as a thing, while retaining space 
for disagreement.
42
 
Raz posits that everyone can agree that the concept of law is related to 
authority.
43
 Authority over another involves showing that the person or 
body asserting authority through directives provides better reasons for 
action to the people purportedly governed by the directive than those 
people’s own reasons for action.44 Practical authority provides a service by 
“mediating between people and the right reasons which apply to them, 
[under particular circumstances,] so that the authority judges and 
pronounces what they ought to do according to right reason.”45  
If this is what authority requires, and law claims authority, law should 
provide better reasons for action under particular circumstances than the 
subject could provide on his or her own. The subject should not have to 
repair to his or her personal conception of morality, the good, the right, or 
the just to figure out what to do when presented with a circumstance 
covered by a directive. The directive provides all the reasons for action. If 
a directive is not authoritative in this sense, it is not law. 
In their article, Bulman-Pozen and Pozen admit to using the term 
“obedience” “looser than some jurisprudes would allow.” “In saying that 
uncivil obedients ‘obey,’ ‘follow,’ or ‘comply with’ law, we do not mean 
to suggest that they necessarily or even normally conform their behavior to 
the law because that is what the law directs them to do.”46 But if an uncivil 
obedient does not adhere to rules promulgated by a body purporting to 
exercise legitimate authority simply because he considers those rules alone 
to provide reasons for action, those rules are not serving as authoritative. 
 
 
 41. Murphy, supra note 37, at 85–86 
 42. Id. 
 43. Id. 
 44. See Joseph Raz, Authority, Law, and Morality, 68 THE MONIST 295, 299 (1985). 
 45. Id.  
 46. Bulman-Pozen & Pozen, supra note 5, at 811. 
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So, motorists who strictly adhere to the fifty-five mile-per-hour speed limit 
as a means to show its own folly are not, in Raz’s sense, obeying any law.  
Driving the posted speed limit may qualify as civil dissent, insofar as 
the act challenges the authoritative directive by drawing attention to the 
fact that hardly anyone considers the directive authoritative. But Raz’s 
positivist account of law poses a significant hurdle for uncivil obedience 
as defined. If one plugs uncivil obedience into Raz’s positivist account of 
the concept of law, she may find that the act in question is really 
subversive rule-following, not subversive law-following. Bulman-Pozen 
and Pozen, in fact, use ‘law’ and ‘official rules’ interchangeably. Whether 
the directive is a law or rule matters because suddenly a new problem 
arises: now one must determine whose or which set of rules matter and 
why. What marks the difference between following the posted speed limit 
(a rule) and following the established social practice of not following the 
posted speed limit (a rule)?
47
  
2. Non-Positivism and Uncivil Obedience 
Ronald Dworkin’s account of the grounds of law (what makes law) 
dramatically differs from Raz’s account. Morality plays a central role in 
ascertaining what the law is. Dworkin approaches the question similar to 
Raz by appealing to values Dworkin considers associated with law.
48
 For 
Dworkin, principles undergirding the rule of law must be satisfied in order 
to identify true claims of law.
49
 Law must be interpreted in its best light, 
considering the political community’s adopted principles and moral 
values.
50
 Dworkin’s philosophical account is far more sophisticated than 
this general gloss allows, but this gloss provides enough information for 
this Article’s purpose.  
Is the posted speed limit law? That question may depend upon the legal 
practice in the relevant community. Let’s say that in the community where 
motorists organized a protest against the posted speed limit by driving the 
speed limit, the practice is as follows: Most motorists drive ten miles 
above the speed limit, law enforcement regularly enforces the speed limit 
only in instances where drivers travel fifteen miles over the speed limit, 
and the speed limit was proposed by Mothers Against Unsafe Driving, a 
 
 
 47. Penalizing rule breaking is available in either instance. One who drives over a posted speed 
limit may receive a speeding ticket and one driving the speed limit may be “honked at or tailgated” or 
perhaps worse if another driver has a fit of road rage. See id. at 825 and n.56.  
 48. Murphy, supra note 37, at 87–88. 
 49. See RONALD DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE 93–94 (1986). 
 50. See id. at 224–75; RONALD DWORKIN, JUSTICE IN ROBES 9–21 (2006). 
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powerful lobbying group, without any empirical data suggesting the 
proposed speed limit best promoted safety, fuel economy, reduction in 
emissions, etcetera; and statutes and regulations are vulnerable to court 
invalidation. A week or so after the motorists engage in their speed limit 
protest, one of the drivers is ticketed for traveling ten miles per hour above 
the posted speed limit. He decides to contest the ticket and resolves to take 
the case as high up the appellate chain as possible.  
At the municipal trial level, he argues that the speed limit is arbitrary 
and capricious and should be invalidated. Judgment is entered against him 
and he appeals. At the appellate level, the judges consider the 
community’s practice and the legal practice surrounding the speed limit at 
issue. The judges also consider precedent where previous courts have held 
statutes and regulations arbitrary and capricious, therefore unenforceable, 
either on their face, by their rationale, or by their enforcement. If the 
judges decide that the speed limit is valid, and all appellate procedures are 
exhausted for the motorist, then the motorist will be said to have violated 
the law. If the judges decide that the speed limit is arbitrary and 
capricious, therefore unenforceable, and all appellate procedures are 
exhausted for the state, then the motorist will be said not to have violated 
the law. Under Dworkin’s interpretive framework, prior treatment of the 
speed limit as law was a mistake.
51
  
Plugging uncivil obedience into this non-positivist framework creates 
the same problems as when the label is plugged into a Razian positivist 
framework. But it also creates other problems that conceptually confound 
uncivil obedience. Recall that anything that aspires to the status of law 
under Dworkin’s framework must promote the best interpretation of the 
political community’s adopted principles and morals. When the rules that 
purport to govern do not conform to established social practice or customs, 
what conditions must exist for these deviations to count as law? How far 
afield can the rules that purport to govern depart from established social 
practices or established political practice and still retain enough legitimacy 
or recognition to comfortably refer to them as law? If law is measured by 
conformity to established political and social practices interpreted in their 
best light, would not obedience to what is later determined a mistake mean 
that the person was not only not obeying any law, but possibly disobeying 
what really was law?
52
  
 
 
 51. Murphy, supra note 37, at 52–53; Dworkin, supra note 49, at 4–6. 
 52. The speed limit may not be the best example to make this point evident or pressing. If the 
maximum speed limit is sixty-five miles per hour, driving fifty-five miles per hour would not generate 
any concern about disobedience to any law unless it was below a minimum speed limit or disruptive in 
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B. Law-Making and Uncivil Obedience 
Perhaps the most troublesome move by Bulman-Pozen and Pozen is 
trying to squeeze uncivil obedience into lawmaking practices. This move 
raises cause for concern that political sleight of hand may come with the 
‘uncivil obedience’ label. The move also threatens to obscure what really 
appears to be at issue: best lawmaking practices in a democratic society 
and political accountability.  
Repair to two examples provided by Bulman-Pozen and Pozen 
demonstrate the problem. First, Republican senators have used the 
filibuster procedure in what some consider unconventional ways in an 
effort to defeat Democratic measures or political nominations. Second, 
Republican State lawmakers have passed health measures that require 
“abortions performed using the drug combination Mifeprex adhere strictly 
to protocol specified by the FDA.”53 Undoubtedly, Democrats could 
employ similar efforts. But Bulman-Pozen and Pozen make clear that they 
believe uncivil obedience as they have defined it will serve as 
Republicans’ primary form of protest.54  
With respect to the first example, political procedures available to 
lawmakers, such as the filibuster, are part of the lawmaking process in the 
United States. The motives that underwrite one party or the other’s 
decision to utilize the procedures are generally political. Trying to work in 
a label like ‘uncivil obedience’ only serves to make these tactics opaque 
by diverting attention from what is obvious political posturing, and 
focusing instead on motives that may only be held by a few in the bunch.  
The same problem arises when an actual law is passed. Some state 
lawmakers, but not necessarily most or all of them, who pass a bill which 
requires abortion clinics to adhere to federal standards might harbor a 
motive to “limit access to abortion.”55 One might say that those persons 
with the requisite motive engaged in uncivil obedience, while others who 
had in mind only health and safety standards did not. Here is where 
political sleight of hand rears its ugly head. The label ‘uncivil obedience’ 
is so subject to cherry picking that one must be on guard when another 
 
 
some other legally relevant sense. A better example is provided below respecting abortion rights and 
state lawmakers attempting to limit access to abortion procedures. If these efforts by lawmakers were 
later determined unconstitutional, the consequence of their disobedience to the law would likely 
already have proven disruptive or even fatal to the lives of some or many women. See infra Part III.B.  
 53. Bulman-Pozen & Pozen, supra note 5, at 838–39.  
 54. Id. at 871. 
 55. Id. at 863. 
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uses the label, for what comes across as critique may really be political 
posturing.  
The abortion example poses additional problems. Bulman-Pozen and 
Pozen concede that “it may sound odd to speak of ‘obedience’ with regard 
to a right or privilege that is framed in discretionary terms,” but they 
maintain that “there is nothing odd about envisioning a gap between what 
is technically permitted by such laws and what prevailing customs or 
understandings would allow.”56 With respect to abortion rights, there is no 
clear gap that either side can point to. For what Bulman-Pozen and Pozen 
view as a Republican attack on abortion rights, Republicans consider part 
of the state’s duty to protect the life of the unborn fetus.57 The United 
States Supreme Court has said that the state has a right to intervene to 
protect the unborn fetus at some point.
58
 So are these Republicans 
engaging in uncivil obedience, as in using the law with a reformist intent, 
or are they just making laws? Again, this raises opportunities for political 
sleight of hand.  
Further, as discussed above, whether and to what extent Republicans 
would be obeying the law may be unclear until the issue is adjudicated. If 
a Court holds that state lawmakers cannot hide their reformist motives 
behind federal regulations in an effort to limit abortion access, and strikes 
a state law as unconstitutional, then these lawmakers arguably violated the 
rights of any woman whose access to an abortion was limited by the 
purported law. They also used the lawmaking apparatus for an unlawful 
purpose, to thwart protected rights. The label ‘uncivil obedience’ distracts 
from what is really at issue, best lawmaking practices in a democratic 
society and political accountability.   
CONCLUSION 
Civil dissent comes in many forms, but ‘uncivil obedience’ as defined 
by Bulman-Pozen and Pozen is hardly distinguishable from civil 
disobedience. Both rely on disobedience to shock the relevant 
community’s sensibilities. To avoid adding clutter to an already vast 
 
 
 56. Id. at 829–30. 
 57. With respect to rights, another issue obscured by the label ‘uncivil obedience’ is the question 
of who gets to decide the scope of rights? The legitimacy of judicial review as practiced in the United 
States, a country touting adherence to democratic principles, is a very contentious issue. See Jeremy 
Waldron, The Core of the Case Against Judicial Review, 115 YALE L.J. 1346 (2006); cf. RONALD 
DWORKIN, FREEDOM’S LAW: THE MORAL READING OF THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION 5–7, 32–33 
(1996). 
 58. Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 869 (1992). 
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conceptual space, the label ‘uncivil obedience’ should be discarded and 
the phenomenon the label purports to describe investigated as a form of 
civil disobedience.   
Uncivil obedience, as thought-provoking as the label appears, should 
be considered a non-starter for any serious normative assessment. As 
defined by Bulman-Pozen and Pozen, the label conceptually unravels 
when plugged into jurisprudential inquires concerning the nature or 
concept of law. The label also threatens to obscure serious political 
questions as to best lawmaking practices in a democratic society and 
creates a real risk for sleight of hand political maneuvering. If Bulman-
Pozen and Pozen wish to draw attention to conservative protest, they can 
merely say, “look, Republicans also engage in civil disobedience.” 
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